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SCHWARZER, District Judge: 
 
         The question before us is whether the acceptance by a minor's 
parents of an 
administrative settlement of the minor's claim under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act ("FTCA") 
releases the United States from further liability where the settlement was 
not judicially approved 
as required by state law.  
                        PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
         On May 23, 1975, plaintiff Sharon Reo was playing in the front 
yard at the New 
Jersey home of her aunt, defendant Patricia D'Esposito.  While a United 
States Postal Service 
employee was handing mail to her aunt, Sharon (who was only 21 months old 
at the time) 
apparently stepped off the curb and in front of the Postal Service truck.  
As the truck drove away, 
it struck Sharon, crushing the third and fourth fingers of her left hand. 
         Sharon's parents, through their attorney, filed a tort claim on 
her behalf.  They 
entered into an administrative settlement, accepting $2,500 to release her 
claim.  Neither 
Sharon's parents nor the Postal Service sought judicial approval of the 
settlement. 
         Subsequent to the settlement, Sharon had three operations on her 
fingers, which 
remain deformed.  On August 11, 1993, when she was 19 (legally an adult), 
Sharon filed this 
action.  She seeks damages against the United States and against 
D'Esposito.  The United States 
moved to dismiss the complaint as barred by the 1976 settlement and 
release and the district 
court granted the motion.  Sharon dismissed the claim against her aunt.  
Judgment was entered 
on January 4, 1996; the notice of appeal was filed December 21, 1995 
(after the court had 
announced its decision to dismiss), and is timely under Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 
4(a)(2).  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2).  We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and reverse. 
                                    DISCUSSION 
         The FTCA subjects the United States to tort liability for 
negligence.  See28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674.  Under the FTCA, the United 
States is liable "in the same manner 
and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances . 
. . ."  28 U.S.C. § 2674.  
Thus, "the extent of the United States' liability under the FTCA is 
generally determined by 
reference to state law."  Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 305, 112 
S.Ct. 711, 714, 116 
L.Ed.2d 731 (1992). 
         In order to promote the efficient disposition of claims against 
the government, the 
FTCA establishes an administrative system.  The claimant is required to 
file a claim with the 
agency allegedly responsible for her injuries.  28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).  The 
agency then may choose 
to pay the claim in full, to offer to settle the claim, or to deny the 
claim within six months.  Id.; 
28 U.S.C. § 2672.  If the agency denies the claim or does not make a final 
disposition within six 
months, the claimant may then file suit in federal court.  28 U.S.C. § 
2675(a). 
         Section 2672 of title 28 provides government agencies with the 
authority to settle 
tort claims administratively.  It also provides that such settlements will 
preclude a subsequent 
suit: 
              The acceptance by the claimant of any such award, 
              compromise, or settlement [administrative 
              settlement pursuant to this provision] shall be final 
              and conclusive on the claimant, and shall constitute 
              a complete release of any claim against the United 
              States and against the employee of the government 
              whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, by 
              reason of the same subject matter. 
 Both parties agree that Reo did not herself settle the claim, and that the 
question is whether her 
parents could settle her claim on her behalf.  See 28 C.F.R. § 14.10 
(claimant is bound by 
settlement entered into with claimant's "agent or legal representative").   
         Under New Jersey Rule of Court 4:44, a parent cannot settle a 
child's claim 
without judicial approval, regardless of whether suit has been filed.  
Colfer v. Royal Globe Ins. 
Co., 519 A.2d 893 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).  Here, no judicial 
approval was obtained, 
and the settlement is therefore incomplete as a matter of state law.   
         The government claims that New Jersey law simply does not apply -
- first, that 
federal law defines who may settle a tort claim on behalf of another, and 
second, that under 
federal law no judicial approval is required for the settlement of a 
minor's claim.  Because we 
find that state law governs here, we need not reach the second of these 
contentions. 
         Section 2672 does not define who may accept a settlement on 
behalf of the 
claimant.  While the interpretive regulations indicate that a claimant's 
"legal representative" can 
bind the claimant to an administrative settlement, see 28 C.F.R. § 14.10, 
the regulations provide 
no guidance how "legal representative" should be defined.  Nothing in the 
legislative history of 
section 2672 or in the drafting history of the regulations provides any 
further guidance.  
         In order to fill this gap, we turn to state law.  Cf. Kamen v. 
Kemper Financial 
Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 1717, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 
(1991).  Federal 
legislation generally "builds upon legal relationships established by the 
states, altering or 
supplanting them only so far as necessary for the special purpose."  Paul 
M. Bator, et al. Hart and 
Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System, 533 (3rd ed. 1988).  
On the one hand, 
where application of state law would impair the federal policy, or where 
there is a "distinct need 
for nationwide legal standards," federal standards must be developed.  See 
Mississippi Band of 
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 42, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 1605, 104 
L.Ed.2d 29 (1989); 
Kamen, 500 U.S. at 98, 111 S.Ct. at 1717.   On the other hand, where state 
law on an issue is 
well-developed, or where Congress specifically intends to subject federal 
actors to local 
standards, state law is preferred.  See DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 
570, 580-81, 76 S.Ct. 974, 
980, 100 L.Ed. 1415 (1956); Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Beaver County, 
328 U.S. 204, 210, 
66 S.Ct. 992, 995, 90 L.Ed. 1172 (1945).  Thus, on issues such as 
corporation law, see Kamen, 
supra, commercial law, see United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 
715, 728, 99 S.Ct. 
1448, 1458, 59 L.Ed.2d 711 (1979), and family law, see DeSylva, supra, 
state-law standards have 
been used to fill the gaps in federal statutory schemes. 
         The basic purpose of the FTCA is to subject the United States to 
tort liability 
under state law to the same extent as private individuals.  State law thus 
governs both the 
creation of liability and the effect of a purported release of liability.  
Green v. United States, 709 
F.2d 1158, 1165 (7th Cir. 1983).  Courts uniformly look to state law to 
determine the validity of 
settlements entered between the government and the claimant both before 
the administrative 
claim is filed, see, e.g., Montellier v. United States, 315 F.2d 180, 185 
(2d Cir. 1963); Cordaro v. 
Lusardi, 354 F. Supp. 1147, 1149-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); cf. Matland v. United 
States, 285 F.2d 
752, 754 (3rd Cir. 1961) (holding that state law governs release of 
liability under FTCA; release 
of joint tortfeasor therefore released United States), and after suit has 
been commenced.  See, 
e.g., Reed by and through Reed v. United States, 891 F.2d 878, 881 n.3 
(11th Cir. 1990) 
(applying Florida law requiring court approval to enforce settlement of 
minor's FTCA claim); 
Dickun v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 136 (W.D.Pa. 1980).   
         The government asserts that these cases do not apply, because the 
release in this 
case was executed after the claim was filed, but before litigation began.  
This distinction might 
make sense when comparing the effect of a release under the specific 
authority of section 2672 
on the settling party with the effect of such a release on other potential 
claimants.  See Schwarder 
v. United States, 974 F.2d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 1992) (drawing this 
distinction).  But it does not 
logically apply when determining if a party has settled.  Under state law, 
Reo's parents could not 
compromise her position before filing the claim (without judicial 
approval), and could not 
compromise her claim after litigation commenced.  There is nothing unique 
about administrative 
settlements that suggests that the authority of Reo's parents to settle 
her claim should be broader 
(or narrower) in this context than in others.  The statute itself provides 
no basis for distinction:  a 
provision authorizing administrative settlements, and making them final, 
does not necessarily 
lead to a conclusion that the enforceability of such settlements will be 
governed by federal law 
rather than state law.  As stated by one district court, section 2672 
simply "does not purport to set 
up rules governing the validity, scope, or interpretation of releases 
arising from its operation."  
Robinson v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 132, 136-37 (N.D.Ill. 1976). 
         This circuit has previously applied state law to determine the 
validity and scope of 
a release under section 2672.  See Thompson v. Wheeler, 898 F.2d 406, 410 
n.3 (3rd. Cir. 1990); 
cf. Macy v. United States, 557 F.2d 391, 394 (3rd Cir. 1977) (same under 
1346(b)).  Turning to 
state law again in this case is appropriate -- the rules governing 
settlement of minor's claims are 
embedded in the traditional state-law domain of contract, agency, and 
family law.  Rather than 
developing a federal common law to govern such questions of authority to 
settle another's claim, 
we can instead rely on the well-established rules of the various States.  
National uniformity is not 
particularly important here, especially since Congress specifically 
contemplated in the FTCA that 
federal agencies would be held to the same standards as private 
individuals.  CompareReconstruction Finance Corp., 328 U.S. at 210, 66 
S.Ct. at 995 (in subjecting federal corporation 
to local real property taxes, Congress intended that "real property" be 
defined under state laws), 
with Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 490 U.S. at 44-45, 109 S.Ct. at 
1606-07 (because 
Congress was concerned about the rights of Indian families vis-a-vis state 
authorities, it was 
unlikely that Congress would have intended to leave the scope of the 
statute's key jurisdictional 
provision subject to definition by state courts as a matter of state law).  
The state law here does 
not discriminate against the government, or run counter to the purposes of 
the FTCA.  SeeReconstruction Finance Corp., 328 U.S. at 210, 66 S.Ct. at 
995.  State law therefore should 
govern. 
         The primary focus of the government's brief, as well as of the 
district court's oral 
explanation of its decision, was on the 1966 amendment to the FTCA and on 
the legislative 
history that explains its purpose.  Prior to 1966, the statute required 
judicial approval of all 
claims (not just those involving minors) where the government was to pay 
more than $2,500.  
P.L. 89-506.  Congress eliminated the requirement of judicial approval in 
1966, and the 
legislative history is replete with statements about promoting quicker 
settlements by doing away 
with the necessity of court proceedings.  See 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2524.  
Nothing in the statute or 
the legislative history, however, indicates that Congress intended to 
eliminate all possibility of 
court proceedings, especially where the interests of minor children and 
other incompetent 
individuals were involved.  Given that Congress was legislating against 
the background of the 
"ancient precept of Anglo-American jurisprudence" requiring court approval 
of the settlement of 
minor's claims, see Dacanay v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 
1978), it would be 
surprising if the 1966 amendment took away this longstanding protection 
without comment.  
Likewise, the implementing regulations contain no indication that 
individuals otherwise 
unauthorized to settle a claim alone (here, the parents) can nevertheless 
settle a claim 
administratively under the FTCA. 
         We therefore hold that state law governs whether an individual 
has the legal 
authority to bind a claimant to an administrative settlement under the 
FTCA. 
          
         The government also contends that a rule requiring judicial 
approval of minor's 
settlements is impracticable, because there is no procedure in place by 
which it could obtain 
judicial approval.  We do not find this argument compelling.  That 
judicial approval was required 
for all administrative settlements before 1966 suggests that the 
government is able to obtain such 
approval when required.   Moreover, petitions to approve settlement of a 
minor's claim are heard 
routinely in both state and federal courts, and such petitions impose 
little burden on courts or 
parties.  The parties to an administrative settlement of a minor's claim 
need only follow the 
procedures in place in either state or federal court for the approval of 
minor's settlements. 
         Finally, the government asserts that applying the state law 
requirement of judicial 
approval here allows Sharon to effectively toll the statute of limitations 
based on her minority.  
The government points to cases holding that the federal tort claims filing 
period is not tolled for 
minors.  See e.g. Zavala v. United States, 876 F.2d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 
1989); Jastremski v. United 
States, 737 F.2d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 1984).  But in this case, the six-
month limitations period 
never began to run, because the agency did not formally deny the claim.  
28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).  If 
the agency does not formally deny the claim, and has not finally disposed 
of the claim within six 
months after it was filed, "the claimant may wait indefinitely before 
filing suit."  Pascale v. 
United States, 998 F.2d 186, 192-93 (3rd Cir. 1993); see also 28 U.S.C. § 
2675(a) (claimant may 
deem agency's failure to dispose of claim a denial of claim after six 
months or at "any time 
thereafter").  Here, the settlement was never judicially approved, and it 
therefore is not final.  
There was thus no final disposition of Sharon's claim, and the agency 
never gave notice that the 
claim was denied.  Sharon retained the option to wait indefinitely, deem 
the claim denied, and 
file suit. 
         The judgment of the district court is REVERSED and the matter is 
REMANDED 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  Costs awarded to 
appellant. 
